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Abstract The method of explication has been somewhat of a hot topic in the
last ten years. Despite the multifaceted research that has been directed at the
issue, one may perceive a lack of step-by-step procedural or structural accounts
of explication. This paper aims at providing a structural account of the method
of explication in continuation of the works of Geo Siegwart. It is enhanced with
a detailed terminology for the assessment and comparison of explications. The
aim is to provide means to talk about explications including their criticisms
and their interrelations. There is hope that this treatment will be able to serve
as a foundation to a step-by-step guide to be established for explicators. At
least it should help to frame and mediate explicative disputes. In closing the
enterprise will be considered an explication of ‘explication’, though consecutive
explications improving on this one are undoubtedly conceivable.
Keywords Explication · Criteria of Adequacy · Philosophical methodology ·
Metaphilosophy
1 Introduction
In the following I will provide a structural account of the method of explication,
or one might say a formal framework that imposes some restraints on what
kind of entity an explication could be. For this purpose I take explication to be
concerned with giving meaning to expressions that are imprecise or otherwise
problematic. I will avoid the talk about concepts since this sometimes dazzling
expression may lead to complications in the discussions about explication.1
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1 This is evidenced, I suppose, by some debates following Strawson (1963) and Schupbach
(2015).
Finalized manuscript (with author information) Click here to view linked References
2 Moritz Cordes
I consider this view to be compatible with Carnap, although he prefers to
talk about concepts in his seminal work on explication.2 More to the point –
and not only concerning the concept/expression distinction –, I will follow
Siegwart (1997b, ch. 24), (1997a) who provided a step-by-step account of
explication improving on Carnap.3 Other procedural approaches to explication
are rare.4 In fact, explication is often portrayed informally as an isolated act of
introduction of a concept or an expression that, apparently, does not include
much preparation or postprocessing.
The paper will run thus: First, I will give some characterizations (postulates
and definitions) of the basic concepts of explication including the six
constituents of an explication (2). In a short excursus I will consider the
construction of a step-by-step guide of explication which may help (potential)
explicators in their business (3). Nothing close to a vade mecum will be
provided! Then I will facilitate means to talk about explication disputes, chains
of explications, and other phenomena in a precise fashion allowing for some
distinctions that are often ignored (4). In some parts of the sections 2 and 4 I
will heavily rely on the work of Siegwart, although several modifications will
be made which will be pointed out then. The final step will comprise some
reflections on what I have done so far and whether this can be considered an
explication of ‘explication’. In the light of these deliberations I will point to
alternative explications of ‘explication’ (5).
What is being proposed is a theoretical and neutral account. (Here)
I do not defend any theses on the usefulness of explication or on the
preference of one kind of explication over another. There may be some implicit
valuations on these matters in the last section, but they should not be read
2 Carnap (1950, ch. I). Note especially the technical remarks on pages 7 and 8, but also
his talk about terms on page 3. At any rate, one should take care not to interpret Carnap’s
use of the expression ‘concept’ in any of the current thick senses. – (1950) is not Carnap’s
first investigation into the method of explication: (1945) is an earlier one.
3 Siegwart’s work seems to have fallen into oblivion with respect to current methodological
and metaphilosophical debates. The earlier Hanna (1968) has suffered a similar fate. It
seems, only Greimann (2007) and Brun (2016) refer to Siegwart. Quite remote from
metaphilosophical debates Glatzer (2012), Hahn (2013), Paasch (2016), and Cordes (2016)
employ Carnapian explication in its Siegwartian implementation.
4 Greimann (2007) and Hanna (1968) have been mentioned already. Justus (2012),
Schupbach (2015), and Shepherd and Justus (2015) make some contributions from
experimental philosophy. Interestingly, Justus (2012, p. 162) observes a related
methodological deficit in contemporary (meta)philosophy as I do: “Rather than become
a staple of philosophical methodology, explication has been challenged on several grounds.”
However, with respect to the works referred to at the end of the preceding note, the
first part of the quote appears debatable. – As to the current discourse on explication,
however, even such dedicated volumes like Wagner (2012) do not boast any systematic
descriptions of the full procedure of explication, though it sheds light on many historical
issues and includes several comparative investigations into aspects of methodology. To
give one (maybe representative) example from this book: Carus’s essay (2012) presents
an intuitively interesting distinction between local and global explication; but he describes
neither in sufficient detail for the reader to get some clear directions as to how to perform
a local or global explication or even what components must be stated when presenting any
such explication. It would be desirable to have Carus’ local and global explication defined
in an explicit fashion comparable to, for example, definitions 17, 18, 20 or 21 below.
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as substantial claims – they only serve to test the ground in order to prepare
further developments of the explicative method. For now, the aims are purely
clarificatory. For that matter, some refinements of explication discussed in
recent studies are neglected here. This is motivated by the focus on a broad
account which leaves out issues that are still in dispute. Furthermore, I am
not here involved in an exegetical investigation into Carnap’s specific ideas
about explication. I especially do not deal with any of his four requirements
(similarity, exactness, fruitfulness, simplicity) in particular. Each of these
requirements has been under scrutiny in the literature on explication. Many
insights resulted from such investigations, but it is hard to condense them
into specific conditions on how to take a specific step within an articulated
procedure of explication. In fact, often it is hard to even relate what a given
researcher says about explication because there is no theory of explication
that is independent from the various readings of the Carnapian requirements.
Thus, as long as philosophers keep referring to Carnap’s outline of the
explicative procedure including the four requirements while understanding the
requirements differently, confusion is bound to ensue. For all these reasons, it
seems important to first give a clear and very general understanding of what
an explication is. Therefore the Carnapian requirements will not be discussed.
A note on the style: I employ a basic formal language for all clarificatory
characterizations below. It is a first-order predicate language with a standard
set theory. The reason for using such a language is clarity. There are strict
regulations on how to correctly postulate axioms and define expressions in such
a setting. Since informal talk adds to the complex state of discussion about
explication, I think one is justified in trying more formal means. Perhaps some
parts of the methodological debate are entangled in misconceptions caused by
the intuitive use of language. At any rate, the goals pursued in this text are
not dependent on the specific formulation of the definitions provided and other
formulations could have been chosen as well. Furthermore, the ›spirit‹ of these
definitions can always be carried over to the informal talk about explications,
too, as long as the informal conception sticks to that ›spirit‹.
2 A Definition of Explication
As I mentioned in the beginning ‘explication’ will be understood as a procedure
that deals with expressions.5 The expression being explicated will be called
explicandum. The explicandum is usually used within some formal or informal
language, the explicandum language. When explicating, the explicandum
and the explicandum language are ›replaced‹ by explicatum and explicatum
5 In connection with explication Quine (1960, §§53-55) prefers to talk about expressions,
too. That there may be a more or less vague concept behind the explicandum (or the
explicatum) is not contested here. Theories about the explicandum concept and the
explicatum concept can be built upon the explication theory that is developed here and
that deals with explicandum and explicatum as expressions. It would be more difficult the
other way around if we agree that concepts are abstractions from expressions between which
some kind of semantic or syntactic equivalence relation holds.
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language.6 This language, too, can be either formal or informal.7 The idea is,
that the explicatum in the explicatum language is ›more precise‹ and does not
have the problems of the explicandum in the explicandum language. In fact,
the explicatum is taken to fulfill certain specific requirements with respect
to the explicatum language, namely the criteria of (explicative) adequacy.8
To this purpose there has to be an explicative introduction of the explicatum
which ensures these criteria.
The six italic expressions in the preceding paragraph can be taken to
refer to the six constituents of an explication.9 Sometimes only the last item,
the explicative introduction, is referred to as an explication (Cohnitz and
Rossberg, 2006, p. 58). But if explication is taken serious as a procedure
with considerable complexities – as is done here – then it is advisable to
let ‘explication’ refer to more than just one item within the whole procedure.
An explication will thus be defined below (definition 3) as the sextuple of
the constituents.10 Before ‘explication’ can be defined thus, it is necessary to
ensure that the six constituents have generic features qualifying them as the
kind of things that can take the respective part in an explication. Hence, we
need to shed some light on what ›expressions‹ and ›languages‹ are in that
context – ›criteria‹ (sets of formulas) and ›introductions‹ (formulas) can be
given directly in the definition of ‘explication’ together with definitions 8 and
9. In order to keep the exposition short, I restrict myself to a brief postulation
of those syntactic object language features that are of prime interest to
explication. In that spirit I take expressions to be simples. Only the empty
set is excluded from the set of all expressions (EXP) because it will serve as a
substitute referent for later definitions 4 to 9:
Postulate 1
∅ /∈ EXP
Thus, basically, expressions can be anything but the empty set. This leaves
enough room to see expressions as entities extraneous to pure set theory
(and thus as urelements) or as set theoretic entities (possibly made up from
6 Some authors prefer the term ‘explicans’ instead of ‘explicatum’ (e. g. Reichenbach
(1951, p. 49); an anonymous reviewer drew my attention to this article). I stick with
‘explicatum’ for two reasons: First, the thing doing the explication (literally, the explicans)
is not the expression but that what will be called ‘explicative introduction’ below. Second,
‘explicatum’ is the technical term employed in most of the literature.
7 Usually, if the explicandum language is formal in some sense already, so will be the
explicatum language.
8 These specific requirements are to be distinguished from the generic requirements
proposed by Carnap (similarity, exactness, fruitfulness, simplicity), though in some cases
the specific requirements may be seen as appropriations of the generic requirements to the
explicative scenario at hand. Toward the end of the current section the exclusion of Carnap’s
requirements will be briefly motivated.
9 Siegwart (1997a, §17) lists the same six constituents of an explication
(“Explikationsfaktoren”).
10 Additional constituents could be incorporated (cf. sect. 5). For now the six constituents
named shall suffice. That is, they will at least suffice to make a point about what a structural
account of explication could look like.
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urelements or from the empty set). For example, one might identify expressions
by their Gödel numbers or one might take any expression, be it formal or
informal, as primitive or one may take some (atomic) expressions as primitive
and others (molecular) as set theoretic constructs (sequences) of the former.
A language will be taken to consist of (i) a grammar including a vocabulary
(VOC) of atomic expressions and a syntax of molecular expressions with a
category of formulas (FORM)11 having elements of the vocabulary as atomic
subexpressions (ASE) and (ii) a set of rules setting up a (possibly empty)
consequence relation (`), though the rules do not have to be limited to logical
or even inferential rules. Instead of defining all components of a language in
detail, the following postulate just captures the relevant features. Their usual
behavior will have to be ensured elsewhere by individually establishing or
describing specific languages:
Postulate 2
For all L: if L is a language, then
L 6= ∅ and
VOC(L) ⊆ EXP and VOC(L) 6= ∅ and
FORM(L) ⊆ EXP and FORM(L) 6= ∅ and
ASEL⊆ VOC(L)×FORM(L) and
`L⊆ ℘(FORM(L))×FORM(L)
Note, definitions and axioms are not considered to be a separate constituent
of a language. But there may be rules in a language regulating the use of
formulas as axioms or definitions. Furthermore, this presentation of a language
does not determine languages to be regimented in any way. This can be seen in
the following possibilities that do not conflict with postulate 2: There need not
be a full syntax; expressions may belong to more than one syntactical category;
vagueness and ambiguity are not excluded; the consequence relation (`L) may
be undecidable; inconsistency is not excluded. For the projected definition of
explication all this is not necessary.
However, any formal language in an intuitive sense can be considered a
language in accordance with this postulate. Thus, Carnap’s languages I and
II (1934) are examples for languages in that sense. ›Natural‹ languages like
English, German, and Latin can be understood as satisfying postulate 2, too, if
one decides on a list of expressions as the vocabulary (VOC) and on a grammar
at least establishing the category of sentences/statements/formulas (FORM)
and the relation of being an atomic subexpression (ASE). In this instance the
consequence relation (`) may or may not be kept empty.12 A third kind of
example for a language Z is the talk practiced in a given field of study, say,
zoology. This would best be rendered as including a consequence relation which
11 In accord with the decision not to dive too deep into the syntactic structure of the
expressions of the object languages, I will not distinguish between closed and open formulas
here. In a more detailed analysis one should be more precise.
12 If such a language with an empty consequence relation is employed as explicatum
language and not only as explicandum language, it will be impossible to prove the success
of an explication (cf. definition 10).
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is not empty but comprises any combination of premises and conclusion which
would have to be accepted within the respective community. We may have,
for example, {‘specimen 13150225 is physeter macrocephalus’}`Z‘the class
mammalia includes specimen 13150225’. So, in this case, zoological taxonomy
together with some informal logic and some grammatical equivalences is seen
as setting up the consequence relation.13
A little step back may be in order. So far I have given two postulates. The
purpose of these postulates is to establish some basic features of languages
which we need if we take language(s) to play a central role in explication. For
this purpose the features should not be seen to be too restrictive. In fact, they
may be too liberal with regard to what Carnap would allow as explicandum
language and explicatum language. I do not oppose introducing additional
restrictions but currently this liberal understanding will suffice. Note, that
the postulates and the following definitions do not call for a reconstruction
of natural languages in order to provide an explication. Not even a rough
imprecise outlining, as was done in the preceding paragraph, is necessarily
needed – that was only done to give an impression of what may be considered
a language for the purposes of systematic talk about explications. Postulate
2 just introduced the minimal properties a language must have to serve as
explicandum language or explicatum language. Consequentially, now we can
take a look at a structural definition of ‘explication’, which, for now, leaves
this notion insensitive to ›success‹:14
Definition 3
For all E: E is an explication iff there are L1, L2, µ1, µ2, X, φ such that:
E = 〈L1, L2, µ1, µ2, X, φ〉
L1 and L2 are languages and
µ1 ∈ VOC(L1) and µ2 ∈ VOC(L2) and
X ⊆ FORM(L2) and X 6= ∅ and
φ ∈ FORM(L2) and µ2 is an ASEL2 of φ
In this and the following definitions the expressions being defined will be
underscored. – One aim of definition 3 is to identify certain phenomena as
explication, though some sextuples are included that are not explications in
any intuitive sense. This will be tolerated in order to enable anyone to call a
13 The conception of a language supposed here can be modified to accomodate more
complex consequence conceptions. For example, as one reviewer suggests, Bayesian settings
may require a consequence relation that admits of strengths.
14 Siegwart’s rather material definition of an ((in)adequate) explication (1997b, p.
262, 01-02) is not equivalent. Most notably, Siegwart demands the fifth constituent
(the criteria of adequacy) to represent distinguished use patterns (“ausgezeichente
Verwendungsmöglichkeiten repräsentieren”). In addition, the sixth constituent is just a
formula here while, in fact, the explicative introduction may as well assume the form of,
say, a metalanguage rule. This is possible in Siegwart’s definition. (For further discussion
see sect. 5!) Despite the differences, I take definition 3 and the following definitions to keep
in the spirit of Siegwart’s theory of explication.
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given constellation of constituents an explication if that helps their respective
purposes.15
Note that definition 3 does not amount to saying a lot. This is so because up
to now the only ›substantial‹ terms (i. e. the non-set-theoretic terms) in this
definition are ‘language’, ‘VOC’, ‘FORM’, and ‘ASE’ and the meaning of these
terms is intentionally left thin as per postulates 1 and 2. It would be wrong to
assume that with the two postulates and this definition of ‘explication’ one has
a thorough grasp of the procedure of explication or one is automatically able
to conduct an explication. All one can do with definition 3 is to call a certain
constellation of linguistic entities that are in accord with the postulates an
explication. It is not even possible to refer to the six constituents by specific
terms. This will be possible only after definitions 4 to 9.
Having said that, it should be clear that calling something an explication
and thus giving an example for an explication is now possible with the help
of definition 3. Here is one example: 〈English, I, ‘successor’, ‘nf’, {‘nf(0) =
1’}, pD1.D7-1q〉 is an explication, more precisely a mathematical successor
explication by Carnap.16 After definitions 4 to 9 we will be able to refer to each
component of this explication with ease. Of course, with the liberal postulates
and the liberal definition of ‘explication’ there will also be unlikely examples
for explications: 〈French, English, ‘chien’, ‘cat’, {‘love gains some inertia’},
‘cats eat grass’〉 or 〈I, I, ‘nf’, ‘nf’, {‘(x)(nf(x) =nf(x))’}, D2〉. I will come back
to some examples for explications once suitable means to talk about them have
been provided.
On the side of completeness one may fear that some explications (in
an intuitive sense) are not explications in the sense just provided. For
example, most explications are not stated in the same fashion as the ones
in the preceding paragraph or one of the constituents might not be directly
identifiable.17 Two things should be said about that: (i) It is true that
some things that one thinks should be explications will not turn out to be
explications on this account. The remedy for this is to switch to a different
theory of explication (which may or may not be a close variant of the one
being proposed here). (ii) But the examples described at the beginning of
this paragraph do not even necessarily fall out of the scope of the proposed
sense of explication. It should be clear that by definition 3 explications are
abstract entities and should not be confused with their (re)presentations in
words and symbols. When explicators ›provide an explication‹ they just utter
a description of an abstract entity. This is what happens in the preceding
paragraph, too, albeit in a formal fashion. Thus, informal or unclear or
15 If one reads definition 3 as (part of) an explication of ‘explication’ (cf. sect. 5), one may
object with Carnap (1950, p. 479): “The result that a proposed explicatum is found too
narrow constitutes a much less serious objection than the result that it is too wide.” But
the truth of this comparative statement largely depends on what the explicator aims for.
16 This refers to Carnap’s language I with its successor function ‘nf’. The two definitions
D1 and D7-1, here conjoined by conjunction, are the following: ‘nf(x) = x′’ and ‘1 = 0′’,
respectively (Carnap, 1934, pp. 15, 51, 52).
17 An anonymous reviewer confronted me with such a scenario.
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incomplete presentations (descriptions) of explications can still be associated
with (one or several) abstract entities which are the explications (in the sense
of definition 3). One purpose of a procedural (not a structural) account of
explication is to lead explicators to give presentations of explications that do
not leave the task of identifying the constituents of these explications to the
reader (see sect. 3).
Next the six constituents of any explication will be defined relative to this
explication in a straightforward fashion. Abbreviation function constants are
given in brackets in the underscored part of each definition. The empty set
serves as a substitute referent.18
Definition 4
For all L,E: L = the explicandum language (L1) of E iff
E is an explication and there are L2, µ1, µ2, X, φ such that
E = 〈L,L2, µ1, µ2, X, φ〉
or
E is not an explication and L = ∅
Definition 5
For all L,E: L = the explicatum language (L2) of E iff
E is an explication and there are L1, µ1, µ2, X, φ such that
E = 〈L1, L, µ1, µ2, X, φ〉
or
E is not an explication and L = ∅
Definition 6
For all µ,E: µ = the explicandum (EX1) of E iff
E is an explication and there are L1, L2, µ2, X, φ such that
E = 〈L1, L2, µ, µ2, X, φ〉
or
E is not an explication and µ = ∅
Definition 7
For all µ,E: µ = the explicatum (EX2) of E iff
E is an explication and there are L1, L2, µ1, X, φ such that
E = 〈L1, L2, µ1, µ,X, φ〉
or
E is not an explication and µ = ∅
18 The definitions in (Siegwart, 1997b, p. 262) are different in two respects from the ones
given here. (i) His definitions are conditional definitions. (ii) He defines by identity and not
by biconditional. Each of the two techniques on its own allows him to avoid providing a
substitute referent like the empty set. The latter option just moves the reference problem
elsewhere. That is why it is avoided here. In addition, conditional definitions are avoided
here in order to guarantee eliminability, which Siegwart sacrifices. The resulting disjunctive
form of each definiens given here is not seen as overly displeasing and the second disjunct
can be ignored for most purposes.
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Definition 8
For all X,E: X = the set of criteria of explicative adequacy (CEA) of
E iff
E is an explication and there are L1, L2, µ1, µ2, φ such that
E = 〈L1, L2, µ1, µ2, X, φ〉
or
E is not an explication and X = ∅
Definition 9
For all φ,E: φ = the explicative introduction (EI) of E iff
E is an explication and there are L1, L2, µ1, µ2, X such
that E = 〈L1, L2, µ1, µ2, X, φ〉
or
E is not an explication and φ = ∅
To give an example, in the sequel ‘L2(E)’ refers to the explicatum language
of E.19 Note that it is not presupposed that E is an explication. If some E
is not an explication, then L2(E) is just the empty set. In fact, E is not an
explication iff L1(E) or ... or EI(E) is the empty set.20
The purpose of definitions 4 to 9 is quite modest: They allow one to refer to
each of the six constituents of an explication by a suggestive term. Only with
the further definitions below the appropriateness of the specific terms chosen
will start to unfold. At least it will do so to the degree that the full theory
suits descriptions of what one would intuitively consider explications.
In the remainder of the text I will often omit ‘explicative’ in ‘criteria of
explicative adequacy’ (definition 8). – After identifying the six constituents of
an explication it is now possible to introduce some helpful distinctions among
explications. In this section I will only give the most immediate distinctions,
starting with the definition of a successful explication as one that fulfills its
criteria of adequacy.21 This yields a binary definition (alternatively, success
could be defined as having degrees).
19 Note that these definitions are not circular. At any stage this is obvious from just
one look at the preceding postulates and definitions. It is true that even before definition 3
reference was made to the six constituents. But it was made only in the motivating prose, not
in the postulates or in definition 3. In fact, one reason for choosing a formal presentation for
the theory of explication lies in the ease of monitoring and preventing such semantic troubles
as circularity. (There is occasion for this remark: A commentator on an early version of this
paper saw some “weird circularity” in these structural definitions.)
20 To elaborate further: The explicandum of anything that is not an explication is the
empty set and it is identical with its explicatum and even with its explicandum language
and so on. The underlying mistake here is to speak about the explicandum (explicatum, ...)
of a non-explication at all. One reviewer drew my attention to the fact that some find this
way of talking problematic. I agree, but this way of talking is not avoided by a conditional
definition – conditional definitions just move the matter to the realm of the undecidable. In
order to prevent talk about the explicandum of a non-explication, one would have to resort
to syntactical exclusion. But this kind of intervention seems disproportionate.
21 Again, this definition excludes Carnap’s requirements. This will be motivated toward
the end of this section.
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Definition 10
For all E: E is a successful explication iff
E is an explication and
for all ψ: if ψ ∈ CEA(E), then {EI(E)}`L2(E)ψ
Obviously, the criteria of adequacy (CEA), the explicative introduction
(EI), and the explicatum language (L2) are the three relevant constituents.
Let us reconsider the first example for an explication given above: 〈English,
I, ‘successor’, ‘nf’, {‘nf(0) = 1’}, pD1.D7-1q〉. It turns out that this is a
successful explication since in language I the only criterion of adequacy
(namely ‘nf(0) = 1’ – that the successor of zero is one) follows from the
explicative introduction, which is the conjunction of D1 and D7-1. In formal
style: {pD1.D7-1q}`I‘nf(0) = 1’. To be sure, in 1934 Carnap did not name
‘nf(0) = 1’ as an explicative criterion nor did he talk about explication at all.
But with the terminology presented here we are able to talk about this as an
explication.
Definition 10 points out the relevance of criteria of adequacy when
explicating. They serve as a measure of success. Thus, if an author tries to
provide an explication without in some fashion providing criteria of adequacy
readers are bound to ascribe unintended criteria of adequacy to it and
assessments of success will probably vary. Taking ‘nf(0) = 1’ as such a criterion
was one example for an unwarranted, though presumably unproblematic
ascription in the above paragraph. Some explicators miss out on providing
criteria of adequacy, but others explicitly provide them.22
In general, the easiest way to produce a successful explication for an
explication with only finitely many criteria of adequacy is to choose as the
explicative introduction just the conjunction of these criteria:
Theorem 11
For all E:
If E is an explication and
`L2(E) is closed under ∧E and
CEA(E) ={φ1, ..., φn} for some finite n and
EI(E) = pφ1 ∧ ... ∧ φnq,
then E is a successful explication
Two things speak against generally synchronizing the criteria of adequacy
and the explicative introduction in that fashion: (i) The proposing of such an
explication may run counter to the rules of introduction23 in the explicatum
language, effectively preventing one from correctly introducing the explicatum
by means of the explicative introduction within the explicatum language. (ii)
22 D7-B in (Carnap, 1942, pp. 27-28) is an explicit example for a criterion of adequacy of
a truth predicate (in a book that is not explicitly concerned with explication methodology).
23 By ‘rule of introduction’ I mean the same as by ‘rule of inference’ except what is being
licensed is an act of definition or of setting an axiom. Here is one example rule of introduction:
If φ is a closed formula consistent with any axioms and definitions already set, then one may
set φ as an axiom. For a full treatment see Reinmuth (2013).
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Explicators will often want to decide on criteria independently from the specific
form of the explicative introduction, forgoing direct synchronizing. Having said
that, of course it is possible to trim the criteria or to tweak the introduction, if
a successful explication is not reached on first attempt. But then the trimming
and tweaking will need justification.
Often an explicative introduction can only unfold its power against a
background theory. If so, success should be measured with respect to a suitable
set of explicatum language formulas representing the background theory. Let
us first define what a theory in a language and what a background theory for
an explication are:
Definition 12
For all T, L: T is a theory in L iff
L is a language and T ⊆ FORM(L)
Definition 13
For all T,E: T is a background theory to E iff
E is an explication and T is a theory in L2(E) and
for all ψ: if ψ ∈ T , then EX2(E) is not an ASEL2(E) of ψ
The last line of definition 13 prohibits the explicatum from occurring in the
background theory. Keeping in the liberal spirit of the preceding postulates
and definitions no constraints of consistency or the like are imposed on these
theories. It is only required that the explicatum does not already appear (is
not an ASE of any formula) in the background theory. Otherwise the theory
would provide more than a background. Now success can be defined in relation
to a given background theory:
Definition 14
For all E, T : E is a successful explication for T iff
T is a background theory to E and
for all ψ: if ψ ∈ CEA(E), then T∪{EI(E)}`L2(E)ψ
Definition 15
For all E, T : E is a non-trivially successful explication for T iff
E is a successful explication for T and
there is ψ such that: ψ ∈ CEA(E) and T 0L2(E)ψ
With definition 14 we have that 〈I, I, ‘nf’, ‘nf’, {‘(x)(nf(x) =nf(x))’}, D2〉
is a trivially successful explication for any background theory since the sole
criterion of adequacy (namely ‘(x)(nf(x) = nf(x))’) is logically true in language
I; the explicative introduction D2 is redundant. D2 still is the explicative
introduction of that explication, but it is a bogus one. – Here is an example for
a non-trivially successful explication for a given background theory: 〈English,
RL, ‘mother’, ‘M’, {‘∀x∀y∀z(M(x, y)∧M(z, y) → x = z)’}, ‘∀x∀y(M(x, y) ↔
P(x, y)∧F(x))’〉. Read ‘P’ as ‘is parent of’ and ‘F’ as ‘is female’. The explicative
introduction is a straightforward definition of motherhood. The sole criterion
of adequacy states left-uniqueness for the motherhood relation. Thus, RL shall
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be a formal first-order language for the talk about family relations. It shall
have a standard consequence relation with no unexpected results that would
amount to substantial axioms or definitions involving the material expressions
for family relations. Axioms shall be included in the theories RT1 and RT2.
Let us say, the axioms of RT1 are consistent and lay down that everybody has
exactly two parents and only one of them is female. Let us say, the axioms of
RT2 do not subscribe to that or any equivalent proposition; but RT2 shall be
consistent, too. Then said explication is non-trivially successful for RT1 and
it is not successful at all for RT2.
Definition 10 and definition 14 are related in the sense that any explication
is successful iff it is successful for ∅. This fact could be taken as an
alternative definition of the unary predicate ‘successful explication’, in which
case Definition 10 would become a theorem. Furthermore, from definition 14
springs a theorem akin to theorem 11 but with a weaker EI.24
Theorem 16
For all E, T :
If T is a background theory to E and
`L2(E) is closed under ∧I, ∧E, →E and
{ψ1, ..., ψm} ⊆ T for some finite m and
CEA(E) ={φ1, ..., φn} for some finite n and
EI(E) = p(ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψm)→ (φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn)q,
then E is a successful explication for T
The limited practicality of theorem 11, as explained there, holds for
theorem 16, too.
A remark on Carnap’s four requirements of adequacy is now in order.
A full discussion of similarity, exactness, fruitfulness and simplicity or their
appropriations to specific explications would be misplaced here, because what
is offered is not a content discussion for specific explications but a structural
account of explication. For that purpose definitions are proposed that relate
six arbitrary constituents to one another. None of them is filled with definite
content (except for illustration purposes). Thus, if one wants to use the
present account of explication and wants all explications to be fruitful in any
Carnapian sense relevant to the field within which that explication is situated,
then it would be wise to try to codify that requirement somehow – for example
as a condition which the fifth constituent (the CEA) may satisfy – and define
fruitfulness according to the pattern suggested by definitions 10, 17, 18: For
all E: E is a fruitful explication iff ... . Said condition takes the place of the
the ellipsis.25
24 An anonymous reviewer drew my attention to theorem 16 and requested the inclusion
of more theorems like, for example, theorem 11.
25 In instances of explication the Carnapian requirements are sometimes refined into more
specific criteria that would fit well into what is here called the criteria of explicative adequacy
(Pinder, 2016, sect. 4.2). This happens particularly often with the requirement of similarity.
Here Siegwart (1997b, pp. 270-272) sees a transformation of Carnap’s similarity requirement
via Quine into what is now known as the criteria of explicative adequacy.
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Similar avenues are available for simplicity and exactness. With such an
approach to the Carnapian requirements the problem of what an explication is
breaks down into two problems that could be tackled separately: (i) What is an
explication, regardless of its cognitive value? One possible answer: A sextuple
as described in definition 3. (ii) What makes an explication worthwhile? One
possible answer: If it is successful as described in definition 10 and fruitful,
simple, exact as described elsewhere.26
To conclude this section we will make a fundamental distinction
between two kinds of explications. Telling intra-language and inter-language
explications27 apart will come in handy:
Definition 17
For all E: E is an intra-language explication iff
E is an explication and L1(E) = L2(E)
Definition 18
For all E: E is an inter-language explication iff
E is an explication and L1(E) 6= L2(E)
Of the last two example explications 〈English, RL, ‘mother’, ‘M’,
{‘∀x∀y∀z(M(x, y)∧M(z, y) → x = y)’}, ‘∀x∀y(M(x, y) ↔ P(x, y)∧F(x))’〉 is
an inter-language explication since English and RL are distinct. 〈I, I, ‘nf’,
‘nf’, {‘(x)(nf(x) =nf(x))’}, D2〉 is an intra-language explication since both
explicandum language and explicatum language are Carnap’s language I.
Whether some given explication is inter-language or intra-language will often
depend on what one takes to be the two relevant languages. Some authors
do not say anything about that matter, but with others at least the target
language (i. e. the explicatum language) is clearly identified.
3 A Procedure of Explication
An explication in the sense here proposed is a sextuple. That does not mean
that every single explication has to be presented in a formal fashion displaying
this sextuple structure at the surface. But the explication definition from the
preceding section makes clear what the constituents are and those should at
least be named somewhere when an explicator submits an explication. Thus,
we arrive at a first rough procedural imperative for explicators: Name each of
the constituents of the explication! Presenting an explication according to this
maxim can be quite easy. It may look like this (the naming of each constituent
is marked by the abbreviations used earlier):
Let us get clear about what we mean by beauty in our everyday
aesthetic assessments (L1) so that we may establish a philosophical
theory of beauty (L2). This theory should reflect what we mean when
26 Additional distinctions of success in explications are given in (Cordes, 2016, p. 38).
27 Cf. Siegwart (1997a, §17): “Binnenexplikation” and “Brückenexplikation”.
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we say that something is beautiful (EX1). As aesthetic assessments are
generally taken to be subjective let us settle on a relative predicate: x
is beautiful to p (EX2). We all agree that only perceptible things are
beautiful to anyone but not everything that is perceptible is beautiful
to everyone. Additionally, it seems important that beautiful things are
pleasing to the senses of the relevant beholder. (CEA) Thus let us settle
on the following characterization: Something is beautiful to somebody
if it has been perceived by that person and that person is pleased by
that perceptive experience (EI).28
To be sure, much is left open in this example which is quite naïve in both
methodic and systematic regards. But it has the advantage that it is easy to
see all six components of the explication as indicated. Each of the components
plays an essential role in the explication, so the author of above paragraph
did right in not leaving anything out. From such a lucid presentation one
could now, with the help of a given background theory, begin to argue for the
criteria of adequacy as they were stated in two sentences. This would conclude
the explicative procedure in a fuller sense.29
In the example the naming of the constituents happens rather ad hoc. It
does not take a seasoned philosopher of aesthetics to see that this explication
needs a lot more motivation for some of the constituents. This is especially clear
with the choice of the explicatum and the criteria of adequacy. In both cases
one may rightfully ask whether other alternatives would be more interesting,
worthwhile, or suitable. To a certain degree all six constituents need some
motivation. With each naming of a constituent a number of choices have been
made. How are those choices justified? What would be a clever way of making
those choices to produce successful explications? This leads to the inevitable
question that is not conclusively answered here: How does the meaning of the
explicandum figure within the explication?
These questions indicate the need for a comprehensive guide to explication.
It is important to see that Carnap’s contribution is only a beginning and
does not provide such a guide. Maybe Hanna (1968, p. 29) was the first
to explicitly name steps (in his case: five steps) that together make up the
procedure of explication. Siegwart (1997a, §§11-16) gave a procedure that is
much more detailed in most respects. He complemented his approach in 2007b
by drawing on Lambert (1771). A similar procedural outline is given by Brun
(2016, sect. 3). Even before Hanna, Tillman (1965) made a proposal to turn
part of Strawson’s critique of Carnap’s explication (“linguistic portrayal”) into
a part of the method of explication – but he did not really come up with
a full procedure. More recently, Hahn (2013, sect. 2.3) and Cordes (2016,
sect. 1.2) contributed further with regard to the assessment of the need for
an explication and to the refinement of criteria of adequacy, respectively.
28 The reader may consider it an exercise to formulate a similar paragraph for another
picturebook explication, for example for Carnap’s fish/piscis explication.
29 Siegwart (1997b, p. 256), (1997a, p. 29) explicitly includes this as the final step in the
explicative procedure.
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In another tradition Shepherd and Justus (2015, sect. 3) contributed some
improvements concerning the explicandum individuation by experimental
philosophy.30
In this article I am quite far from putting together a full guide from all these
sources. Instead I am concerned with giving a theoretical account or framework
of explication. But I would like to stress the fact that both enterprises,
providing a theoretical account of explication and providing a guide for
potential explicators, are closely dependent on one another. Any refinement
of how explication is done may bear on how we should theoretically conceive
of explication. On the other hand, some degree of theoretical description of
explication is always needed to tell explicators what they should do when
explicating. In that spirit, the theoretical account of explication given in
the preceding section may serve as a foundation for developing a procedural
account guiding the explicator. The maxim at the beginning of this section
exemplifies this approach: Name each of the constituents of the explication!
Instead of giving a full procedural outline, I restrict myself to illustrating
how one may draw on insights from other fields of study to refine the
procedure. There is, for example, the question as to what regulations should
apply to the explicative introduction. Often the explicator wants a definition.
How this is correctly provided is an issue treated in formal and informal
definition theory. Thus, if the explicatum is a predicate one may demand of
the explicative introduction to be a universal biconditional (which would have
to satisfy additional criteria). But under the current account of explication
the explicative introduction could also be a conditional definition, an axiom,
conjunctions of axioms and definitions, or some other kind of formula.31
The most pertinent measure of what is a formally admissible explicative
introduction can be provided by the explicatum language. For that purpose
languages have to be construed in a way that they provide regulations for
object-language means of conceptual introduction (like defining). This could
be postulated in the following fashion:
Postulate 19
For all L: if L is a definitional language, then
L is a language and
DEFL⊆ ℘(FORM(L))×FORM(L) and DEFL 6= ∅
Just like the consequence relation the definition relation relates sets of
formulas to formulas. That way it is possible to talk about some formula
being a definition relative to a theory (which, for example, includes previous
definitions and axioms). Definitional explications can then be easily defined:
30 A paper providing further methodological references is in preparation.
31 In the proposed conception the introduction of the explicatum cannot be facilitated
by the setting of rules for inferring or for constating formulas – at least if the explicatum




For all E, T : E is a definitional explication for T iff
T is a background theory to E and
(T , EI(E)) ∈ DEFL2(E)
Definition 21
For all E: E is a definitional explication iff
there is a T such that E is a definitional explication for T
The explication of beauty above concluded thus: ‘something is beautiful
to somebody if it has been perceived by that person and that person is
pleased by that perceptive experience’. The ‘if’ can plausibly be read as
‘iff’. Then with some acceptable provisions for the definition rules of the
philosophical explicatum language we can say that that explication is a
definitional explication. Definition 20 allows to relativize the property of being
a definitional explication to some background theory. It presupposes that
in a language something is a definition only with respect to some theory.
This makes it possible to require of a definition to have a definiens in which
all material expressions have been introduced beforehand (namely in that
background theory).
This only gives a rough first impression of what one needs to think about
when trying to provide a guide to explication which respects customs like
standard definition theory. And this example deals with just two of the
constituents of an explication. The processes involved in the choice of the
other constituents have to be described with recourse to fields of study other
than definition theory. – So far it should have become clear that explication
“is certainly not a mechanical method or decision procedure. But neither is it
arbitrary.”32 I will leave this issue at this point and, in the next section, give
some distinctions which can be made without direct reference to features of
an explication procedure or an explication guide.
4 A Way to Talk about Explications
Some means to talk about explication have been presented in the preceding
sections. This will not be enough to facilitate a comprehensive discourse
about explications. When, for example, one wants to assess the quality of an
explication there are only the internal and theory relative assessment options
(definitions 10, 14, and 15) available for now. A way to comparatively assess
different explications has not yet been provided. This deficit will be amended
now.
Note that the following and preceding definitions are all founded on a
formal understanding of explications as sextuples. But the ›spirit‹ of the
32 Creath (2012, p. 162) describes the related but distinct method of logical analysis in
these words.
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definitions can always be carried over to the informal talk about explications,
as stated in the beginning. – The first batch of definitions largely follows
Siegwart33 and helps to specify at which various points two explications
may differ and still be called alternatives to one another. This is the case if
two explications explicate the same explicandum from the same explicandum
language:
Definition 22
For all E,E∗: E is an explication alternative to E∗ iff
E and E∗ are explications and E 6= E∗ and
L1(E) = L1(E∗) and EX1(E) = EX1(E∗)
The realm of explication alternatives is limited to those pairs of non-
identical explications that have at least the explicandum and the explicandum
language in common. Thus, if an explication of ‘meaningless’ and an
explication of ‘pseudo-problem’ from everyday philosophy talk are provided,
they should not be seen as explication alternatives vying for interpretive
authority over what philosophers say. What is being explicated in the two
explications is just different and both explicanda may have any right to an
explication. Definition 22, thus, suggests that there is no (explicative) conflict
if two explicators explicate different explicanda from different explicandum
languages.
If, on the other hand, two explicators both try to explicate ‘meaningless’
from everyday philosophy talk and do not reach the same results in all respects,
then they present explication alternatives which may give rise to discussion
and dispute. Thus, once two explications have the same explicandum and
explicandum language they will be considered explication alternatives with
respect to one another. Then, of course, the question is, in what respects may
explication alternatives differ? There are four remaining constituents. It is
sensible to classify the alternatives with regard to these constituents:
Definition 23
For all E,E∗: E is a linguistic explication alternative to E∗ iff
E is an explication alternative to E∗ and
L2(E) 6= L2(E∗)
Definition 24
For all E,E∗: E is a lexical explication alternative to E∗ iff
E is an explication alternative to E∗ and
EX2(E) 6= EX2(E∗)
Definition 25
For all E,E∗: E is a criterial explication alternative to E∗ iff
E is an explication alternative to E∗ and
CEA(E) 6= CEA(E∗)
33 See (1997b, pp. 263-264). Some adjustments to the current framework are made.
Definitions 27 and 30 are entirely new.
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Definition 26
For all E,E∗: E is an introductory explication alternative to E∗ iff
E is an explication alternative to E∗ and
EI(E) 6= EI(E∗)
There is nothing spectacular hidden in these definitions. Basically, they
just nail down four adjectives in their application to the term ‘explication
alternative’, namely ‘linguistic’, ‘lexical’, ‘criterial’, and ‘introductory’.34
Examples for the various kinds of explication alternatives are easily found:
Maybe the best known introductory alternatives are those that are associated
with the various definitions of an ordered pair. Insofar as they all have the
characteristic property of ordered pairs as the (only) criterion of adequacy,
none of them is a criterial explication alternative to any other. If one
frames them in a way that they are neither lexical nor linguistic explication
alternatives they still turn out to be introductory explication alternatives.
Criterial explication alternatives can be seen in various social explications
of gender. Most of them can be thought of as starting with the explicandum
‘gender’ from everyday English. As an explicatum we can choose ‘g’ from a
given sociological language as a one-place expression that works like a function
constant. (Thus the explication alternatives considered are not linguistic or
lexical explication alternatives.) But one explication may try to provide ‘g’ as
an expression which attributes to someone a function value that reflects that
person’s gender self-ascription, while another explication may try to provide
that expression as a device for categorizing people into two groups (for example
for the purpose of studying how people of those groups are treated differently).
These stipulations can be framed as different criteria of adequacy35 which, of
course, ask for different explicative introductions.
Lexical explication alternatives that are not linguistic explication
alternatives may not occur very frequently, but they can be constructed easily.
The word ‘successor’ from informal mathematics is usually taken to mean
‘direct successor’. The occasional need for the word ‘direct’ is due to the
alternative reading as ‘any number that comes later in the natural numbers’.
While the former reading usually takes the function constant ‘S’ as the formal
language explicatum, the latter reading should take the predicate constant
‘<’. Thus we have two lexical explication alternatives which – if successful and
34 Instead of ‘introductory’ some may prefer ‘semantical’ for the fourth kind of explication
alternative. This would recognize the explicative introduction as a semantical entity or as
related to semantics. But it may also be perceived as inscribing specific meaning-theoretic
views into the terminology. I would like to avoid this for now. – With regard to lexical
explication alternatives theorists may further want to distinguish between whether two
explicata differ in their grammatical category or in the arity or in another respect. See
(Siegwart, 1997b, p. 263).
35 The CEA for the first explication could be {‘for any person p it should hold that when
asked for their gender in most cases p names g(p)’} and for the second {‘the range of values of
g is male and female’}. (There may be explications that satisfy both criteria, coincidentally
or on purpose.)
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within usual use of the formal expressions – are also criterial and introductory
explication alternatives.36
With some background assumptions one will have that, usually, linguistic
explication alternatives are lexical explication alternatives, because if the
explicatum language is altered then often the new explicatum language
does not have the same vocabulary and a different expression is chosen as
the explicatum. Here is an example: Suppose someone has an explication
for ‘belongs’ (explicandum) with a set theoretic explicatum language. The
explicatum may be the element predicate ‘∈’. If, then, a step is made to
a different explicatum language, say, mereology, we arrive at a linguistic
explication alternative. The mereological language may not contain ‘∈’. Thus
one has to choose a different explicatum. This then yields a lexical explication
alternative. Furthermore, probably both the criteria of adequacy and the
explicative introduction will change, too. In other words, the explication
alternatives are also criterial and introductory explication alternatives. But
this need not be so. Starting from one explication one may switch to a different
explicatum language which is possibly weaker in a logical sense. In that case
one may have two linguistic explication alternatives, say, a classical one and
an intuitionistic one, which may share the explicatum, the criteria of adequacy
and the explicative introduction.
Coming back to the example for introductory explication alternatives,
namely the different definitions of the ordered pair, one may feel the need
to point out that they are not different in the sense that they choose different
forms of introduction. After all, they all are definitons. In addition, they are
all intended to be employed against the same set-theoretic background theory
in the same language and all of them are associated with the same criterion
of adequacy. This suggests a specific refinement of the concept of introductory
explication alternatives:
Definition 27
For all E,E∗: E is a just definitional explication alternative to E∗ iff
E is an explication alternative to E∗ and
L2(E) = L2(E∗) and
EX2(E) = EX2(E∗) and
CEA(E) = CEA(E∗) and
E and E∗ are definitional explications
The word ‘just’ in the definiendum signals that all constituents except
the explicative introduction are in accord.37 – Note, that from the first four
conditions in the definiens it follows that EI(E) 6= EI(E∗). Thus, the relation
defined is irreflexive.
36 Justus (2012, p. 168) draws attention to the fact that lexical explication alternatives are
sometimes advisable even if the explicandum is not ambiguous in the explicandum language.
37 Defining ‘is a definitional explication alternative’ (without ‘just’) would be more
adequately achieved by accepting any pair of introductory explication alternatives which
are both definitional explications.
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Now, if suitably portrayed as explications, the different definitions of
‘ordered pair’ are definitional explication alternatives. This rather superficial
observation can be more closely studied by paying attention to whether the
different definitions ›amount to the same thing‹:38
Definition 28
For all E,E∗, T : E is a consonant explication to E∗ under T iff
E and E∗ are both definitional explications for T and
E = E∗
or
E is a just definitional explication alternative to E∗ and
T∪{EI(E)}`L2(E)EI(E∗) and T∪{EI(E∗)}`L2(E∗)EI(E)
Definition 29
For all E,E∗: E is a consonant explication alternative to E∗ iff
E is a consonant explication to E∗ under ∅
Now, the various definitions of ‘ordered pair’ can be qualified as just
definitional explication alternatives that are not consonant under the usual
set theories, since their definientia are not equivalent under these theories.
Two explications that are consonant to one another under the usual set
theories can be associated with one of the usual definitions, say, Kuratowski’s
‘〈x, y〉 = {{x}, {x, y}}’ and a set-theoretically inert variant of it, namely
‘〈x, y〉 = {{x, y}, {x}}’. Here, both explicative introductions are equivalent
with regard to the suggested background theories.
The preceding definitions mostly dealt with explicative introductions. In
principle, explication alternatives can be related to one another with respect
to the other constituents, too. For example, the criteria of adequacy even allow
for a comparative assessment of two explications:
Definition 30
For all E,E∗: E is a more demanding explication than E∗ iff
E is an explication alternative to E∗ and
for all ψ: if ψ ∈ CEA(E∗), then CEA(E) `L2(E)ψ and
there is ψ such that: ψ ∈ CEA(E) and CEA(E∗) 0L2(E∗)ψ
This definition suggests a point of departure for further elaborations
once an explication has proven successful. For example, if an explication of
‘thinking’ in the field of A.I. is successful in that it excludes all computers
from the realm of thinking things and qualifies at least some humans as
thinking (two criteria of adequacy) one may want to strengthen these criteria
by adding another one which requires all humans between 18 and 65 who are
in good health to be thinking. Such an explicative endeavour would be more
demanding, intuitively and also according to definition 30.
38 Here, in distinction to Siegwart (1997b, p. 264), the binary consonance relation is
reflexive for definitional explications.
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What is the use of the definitions presented in this section so far with
regard to the bigger picture? First and foremost they help to localize
dissent between two disputing explicators. Definitions 23 to 26 suggest that
a discussion between vying explicators may be streamlined by consciously
focusing on one constituent. In reality, many disputing explicators speak of
the differences in the explicative definition (i. e. the explicative introduction)
only. Explicators should always consider that they may have different criteria
of adequacy, which prove different explicative introductions successful. In
everyday situations people tend to overlook this fact as one can easily see
from semantic disputes that fall short of taking into account the different goals
associated with different definitions of one term. But two explicators proposing
criterial explication alternatives may not have the need to dispute the other’s
explication at all. – Definitions 27 to 30 allow for more fine-grained distinctions
with respect to the criteria of adequacy and the explicative introduction. It
might be interesting to develop similar or even subtler distinctions with respect
to all six constituents of explications.
On a less harmonious view, this terminology of explication alternatives does
not only relate explications to one another, it is a starting point for criticism
directed at explications, too. Somebody who wants to criticize an explication
may do so by just naming a modification of any of the six constituents
and demanding a justification for the unmodified constituent in light of the
modified one. Thus, if I am dissatisfied with an explication of ‘gender’ as a one-
place function constant, I may direct the explicators attention to an alternative
explicatum, say, a two-place function which is capable of relating a person to
its gender dependent on a time index. The explicator and I can now engage in
a dispute which may or may not involve consideration of the other explication
constituents.
Explication alternatives could be a vast field of study but there are
several other interesting ways to relate explications to one another. For
example, convergent explications are something like an opposite to explication
alternatives in that they may differ with respect to explicandum and
explicandum language:
Definition 31
For all E,E∗, T : E and E∗ are convergent explications under T iff
E and E∗ are explications and T is a theory in L2(E) and
L2(E) = L2(E∗) and EX2(E) = EX2(E∗) and
T∪{EI(E)}`L2(E)EI(E∗) and T∪{EI(E∗)}`L2(E)EI(E)
This is quite similar to definition 28, but the intended area of application
for the consonance relation is among explication alternatives, although it is
not limited to them. Definition 31 is intended for explications that are not
explication alternatives. The latter of the two following definitions provides
the suitable terminology for such non-alternatives.
22 Moritz Cordes
Definition 32
For all E,E∗: E and E∗ are convergent explications iff
E and E∗ are convergent explications under ∅
Definition 33
For all E,E∗: E and E∗ are genetically different explications iff
EX1(E) 6= EX1(E∗) or L1(E) 6= L1(E∗)
These definitions suggest that sometimes one and the same expression
in a language may serve as explicatum of different explications that started
with different explicanda and/or in different explicandum languages. If such
a constellation occurs one may consider both explications as cumulatively
fruitful or illuminating depending on how far ›apart‹ the two explicanda or
explicandum languages are. For example, ‘pseudo-sentence’ from the polemics
of the Vienna Circle and ‘fashionable nonsense’ from Sokal and Bricmont’s
criticism of postmodernism (1998) can both be explicated. It is conceivable
that the two explications lead to a common language where one explicatum
with the same definition represents both explicanda.39 Then we can speak of
convergent explications that are genetically different.
Another interesting constellation are explications whose explicative
introductions together constitute a theory in a common language:
Definition 34
For all A, T : A is an explicative constitution of T iff
A is a non-empty set of explications and
for all E,E∗: if {E,E∗} ⊆ A and E 6= E∗, then L2(E) =
L2(E∗) and EX2(E) 6= EX2(E∗) and
T ={φ | there is E such that: E ∈ A and φ =EI(E)}
An explicative constitution of a theory is not that spectacular if one
disregards all the work that went into each of the explications that are an
element of the whole constellation. It is just a compilation of explications with
different explicata that happen to have a common explicatum language. Thus,
even the set of all explications ever proposed in, say, the language of some
specific set theory (e. g. NBGU) explicatively constitutes a certain theory
– probably an inconsistent one. It gets more interesting if the explications
build up on one another by reusing the results of one explication in the
explicative introduction of the next explication. These constellations are chains
of explications (cf. Siegwart (1997a, §13), Lutz (2012, p. 20)):
Definition 35
For all E: E is a chain of explications iff
E is a non-empty, finite sequence of explications E1, ..., Ek and
for all m,n: if 0 < m < n ≤ k, then EX2(En) is not an
atomic subexpression of EI(Em) and
for all n: if 0 < n < k, then L2(Ek) = L2(En)
39 For an explicative study of ‘pseudo-sentence’ and similar terms see (Cordes, 2016).
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The language conception stipulated in postulate 2 at the beginning of this
article is fairly broad. With a more specific conception definition 35 could be
tailored to better suit scenarios in which consecutive definitions or axioms
cumulatively create larger and larger languages. Depending on the specific
proposal, relations between these languages could then be made explicit, either
in set-theoretic terms (e. g. L2(E1) ⊆ L2(E2)) or in other terms (e. g. L2(E2) is
an extension of L2(E1)). For now the identity condition at the end of definition
35 simply requires a chain of explications to have a constant overarching
language L2(Ek). – The following definition defines a special case of chains
of explications:
Definition 36
For all E: E is a single-source chain of explications iff
E is a chain of explications E1, ..., Ek and
for all n: if 0 < n < k, then L1(Ek) = L1(En)
The single-source chain of explications seems to be the standard case
for chains of explications because it seems sensible to relate explicata in an
explicatum language whose explicanda were already used within the same
context or language before the explication. In fact, the chain of explications
may introduce each explicatum in an order that was inspired by some kind
of order of the explicanda in the explicandum language. But, in general, no
demands can be made about the kind of order between the explicanda, since,
usually, the explicanda and the explicandum languages are not sufficiently
structured in any serviceable sense. This ›disorder‹ may even be the motive
for the explication. On the side of the explicata there is a constraint on the
order that prevents definitional circularity.
Another phenomenon has been dubbed ‘chain of explication’, too
(Siegwart, 1997b, p. 268). This is more appropriately called a ‘history of
explications’. It refers to a number of several explication alternatives (i. e.
same explicandum and same explicandum language) in a chronological order:
Definition 37
For all E: E is a history of explications iff
E is a non-empty sequence of explications that are mutual
explication alternatives
This relates back to definition 22. It could also be expressed via definition
33 since explication alternatives are explications that are not genetically
different. The correct chronological order is not included in definition 37
because that would require explications to have a temporal date which runs
counter to the abstract character given to explications in this paper. Note
that a history of explications is not defined as being finite which suggests that
the business of explication can be perceived as open ended. – In part Frege’s
Foundations of Arithmetic (1953) can be read as a presentation of a history
of explications of the term ‘number’ (‘Anzahl’) supplemented with discussion
and criticism.
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Quite unrelated to chains or histories of explications it sometimes occurs
that a given explication is improved upon because certain problems surface
in the use of the explicatum within the explicatum language calling for yet
another explication. A definition may run like this:
Definition 38
For all E,E∗: E is a consecutive explication to E∗ iff
E and E∗ are explications and
L2(E∗) = L1(E) and EX2(E∗) = EX1(E)
Definition 39
For all E,E∗: E is a close consecutive explication to E∗ iff
E is a consecutive explication to E∗ and
CEA(E∗) ⊆ CEA(E)
The development of set theory can be seen as several consecutive
explications. Given by the name of the explicators for the sake of brevity
Cantor, Frege, and Russell/Whitehead are part of that progression. –
Definition 39 mirrors the fact that sometimes the goal of an explication
(formulated as the criteria of explicative adequacy) does not diminish in a
consecutive explication but, instead, is enhanced by further requirements.
However, this is not always so. The problems with an explicatum in an
explicatum language which motivate the consecutive explication may be
related to defects of the criteria of adequacy of the first explication. For
instance, the criteria may be inconsistent. If so, then for the consecutive
explication some of the criteria should be deleted.
5 An Explication of ‘explication’
What has been done in the previous sections can be seen as presenting an
explication of ‘explication’40, though it was presented without adherence to
an explication manual (cf. sect. 3). Nonetheless it is possible to identify
the constituents of this explication. The explicandum is ‘explication’.
The explicandum language is something we may call the contemporary
philosopher’s English (CPE). The explicatum according to definition 3 is
‘is an explication’. I would like to consider the explicatum language to be
CPE, too. Of course, not every contemporary English speaking philosopher
will employ all the expressions I employed here, but that just means each
contemporary philosopher employs only a part of CPE. Thus, CPE should be
considered a language, in part formal and in part informal, that is shared by
many speakers with none of them employing all parts of it. This arrangement
40 The title of this section has been used before: (Hanna, 1968), (Wilson, 2012, p. 205).
Greimann’s employment of this construction (2007, sect. 2) is problematic: According to
his own characterization of ‘explication’ he does not provide an explication of ‘explication’.
Kitcher (2012, p. 202) applies this term to Carnap’s exposition.
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renders the explication of ‘explication’ an intra-language explication according
to definition 15.41
Obviously, the explicative introduction of the explication of ‘explication’
should at least include definition 3. In fact, it may be more sensible to
include definitions 4 to 9, too, since they directly define the six constituents
of any explication. Thus, the explicative introduction in this explication of
‘explication’ is the conjunction of definitions 3 to 9. Please note: It would be
misleading to call definition 3 (or for that matter, the conjunction of definitions
3 to 9) the explication – it is just one constituent of the explication or even
just one part of one constituent!
The fifth constituent, the criteria of explicative adequacy, are harder to
come by. They are not explicitly given anywhere in the previous sections, but
I can give some sample criteria here. For instance, it was an implicit aim to
explicate ‘explication’ in a way that (i) identifies explicandum, explicatum,
their respective languages, a specific explicative introduction, and the criteria
of explicative adequacy in an explication. (ii) Furthermore, explications were
supposed to be not confined to definitions. (iii) It must be possible for there
to be explications with informal explication languages, too. One rather formal
criterion was, that (iv) explications were supposed to be sets of some kind. This
criterion was not motivated materially but methodologically: If explications
are set-theoretic entities one has many means available to refine further talk
about them.
In the preceding three paragraphs, a full explication is outlined. Note
that the success of the explication (definition 10) cannot be assessed as long
as there is no consequence relation spelled out for CPE. If we attribute to
CPE a consequence relation along the lines of an informal classical first-order
logic, then the explication is not successful on its own. More specifically, we
would have to presuppose some set theory, some synonymies between informal
expressions, and the existence of languages with suitable properties. Otherwise
the third criterion of adequacy given in the previous paragraph would not turn
out true. Hence, even if we accept these rather harmless criteria of adequacy,
the explication is only successful for some background theory T . But not any
set-theoretic or other formula will do as part of a background theory. For
example, many definitions given here cannot be part of a background theory
(definition 13) because they involve the explicatum and, thus, they are not
really ›background‹ with respect to the explication of ‘explication’.
Up to now considerations in this section were a presentation of an
explication of ‘explication’. But there are several unfinished construction sites
here. One was pointed out in the preceding paragraph. Some others have been
hinted at in the course of the paper. A consecutive explication of ‘explication’
may be in order. This will not be given here, but we may jot down some ideas
that would help such an effort. It is important to realize that this need for
another explication is relative. For many purposes the theory of explication
41 To be sure, staying within the boundaries of CPE still allows us to transition from a
less exact part of CPE to “a more exact part of it” (Carnap, 1963, p. 935).
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presented here may work just fine, the same way as Carnap’s informal theory
of explication seems to have worked fine for him for many years. Maybe with
Strawson things got problematic. After his contribution one may have several
issues with Carnapian explication that call for more precision. But it is hard to
find something that amounts to an explication of ‘explication’ (in the sense of
either (i) a formal account of a theory of explication or (ii) a procedural outline
of explication, which can go a long way toward a theory of explication). Most
investigations into explication avoid these issues and focus on, for instance,
justifying Carnapian criteria of adequacy without explaining what ›exact‹
conception of explication they presuppose.42
To get to some points where enhancement is conceivable: First, it would be
convenient to have a whole explicatum theory incorporated into the explication
as another constituent. This theory may comprise additional definitions
building on the explicative introduction or definitions and postulates that
serve as a foundation for the explicative introduction.43 Thus, for example,
all the postulates and definitions given in this text may together form the
explicatum theory for the explication of ‘explication’. Non-essential material
may be included into an explicatum theory, too.
Second, one may want a stronger notion of languages, or at least
of explicatum languages in order to generally distinguish between various
kinds of introduction formats: axioms/postulates, unconditional definitions,
conditional definitions etc.. This enhancement can be achieved without
demanding that all explicatum languages be formal.
Third, in order to accommodate metalanguage introduction procedures a
major modification in the sixth constituent, the explicative introduction, would
be in order. It is obvious that in formal and informal languages we regularly
turn to metalanguage support in order to regulate some expressions, especially
the basic ones like logical operators, but also the empirical ones that have
to be introduced operationally. Thus metalanguage rules could be considered
admissible explicative introductions. A weaker version of this modification
may include changing the explicative introduction from a single formula to a
possibly infinite set of formulas.
Fourth, the explicandum and the explicatum rarely are single expressions.
When explicating an expression we often also explicate other expressions that
are taken to be synonymous in some intuitive sense (cf. definition 31). On
the explicatum side, we often find out that we want a more diverse squad
of expressions serving our post-explicative purposes.44 This can be seen in
42 This does not mean that each such investigation is problematic. This is most decidedly
not so. Carnap’s criteria can be discussed without setting up a whole theory of explication.
But one has to accept, that this way a particular systematic shortcoming in the overall
explication debate will always remain.
43 One may compare this enhanced approach to the crutch employed earlier in this section
in the identification of the explicative introduction as a conjunction of multiple definitions.
44 Greimann (2007, p. 266) misleadingly talks about explications without explicata.
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the current paper, too, as there are many definitions of expressions without a
similar multitude of expressions in the pre-explicative discourse.45
Fifth and finally, the criteria of explicative adequacy are currently all object
language formulas although sometimes explicators may want some formula to
not follow from the explicative introduction (and its negation following from
it neither). If the explicatum language does not include its own metalanguage,
as is often the case, the desideratum of not being a consequence cannot be
expressed in the explicatum language.46 Hence, the criteria of adequacy could
be re-imagined as a set of either object- and metalanguage formulas or as
metalanguage formulas exclusively (Cordes, 2016, p. 31). The switch to the
metalanguage would accommodate explications that have ›superpropositional‹
explicata, for example illocutionary force indicators.47
6 Conclusion
In this paper I proposed a structural account of explication. I tried to
stay true to a tradition that prominently started with Carnap and – less
prominently – was continued by Greimann, Hanna, and Siegwart. One
characteristic of this approach was to disregard any concept ontology and to
relate explication to expressions exclusively. Another one was to provide some
measure of independence from any qualificatory desiderata like the Carnapian
requirements. The approach included a demand for a step-by-step procedure
that can guide any philosopher in the practice of explication. Some terminology
was established in order to relate explications to one another. The merit of all
this was hinted at by means of some textbook style examples. I hope to have
provided a serviceable theory of explication, but I also admitted that there are
several aspects where improvement is possible.
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45 This is true at least if the pre-explicative use refers to single authors writing on
explication. Presumably the cumulative pre-explicative talk about explication by all authors
writing on that topic is much more diverse than the expressions defined here. – Glatzer (2012)
is an example for disambiguation by means of explication.
46 This goes for some other desiderata, too. One reviewer drew my attention to the
Carnapian desideratum of fruitfulness, specifically.
47 One example: In (Reinmuth and Cordes, 2017, sect. 4-5) a formal language is introduced
which includes ‘Therefore’ as an illocutionary operator. Its application to a formula does not
yield a formula. So criteria of adequacy limited to object language formulas will not involve
‘Therefore’. Still, this expression may be seen as an explicatum. Suitable explicanda are any
natural language terms expressing acts of inference. Cf. (Hinst, 1982), (Siegwart, 2007a).
28 Moritz Cordes
References
Brun G (2016) Explication as a method of conceptual re-engineering.
Erkenntnis 81(6):1211–1241, DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9791-5
Carnap R (1934) Logische Syntax der Sprache. Springer, Wien
Carnap R (1942) Introduction to Semantics. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
Carnap R (1945) The two concepts of probability. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 5(4):513–532
Carnap R (1950) Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago
Press, Chicago
Carnap R (1963) The philosopher replies. In: Schilpp PA (ed) The Philosophy
of Rudolf Carnap, Open Court, La Salle, Ill., pp 857–1013
Carus AW (2012) Engineers and drifters: The ideal of explication and its
critics. In: Wagner P (ed) Carnap’s Ideal of Explication and Naturalism,
Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire, pp 225–239
Cohnitz D, Rossberg M (2006) Nelson Goodman. Acumen, Chesham, Bucks
Cordes M (2016) Scheinprobleme. ein explikativer Versuch. Dissertation,
Available online
Creath R (2012) Before explication. In: Wagner P (ed) Carnap’s Ideal of
Explication and Naturalism, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmill, Basingstoke,
Hampshire, pp 161–174
Frege G (1953) The Foundations of Arithmetic. A logico-mathematical enquiry
into the concept of number. Basil Blackwell, Oxford
Glatzer J (2012) Schönheit. Ein Klärungsversuch. Ontos, Frankfurt et al.
Greimann D (2007) Regeln für das korrekte Explizieren von Begriffen.
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 61(3):261–282
Hahn S (2013) Rationalität. Eine Kartierung. Mentis, Münster
Hanna JF (1968) An explication of ‘explication’. Philosophy of Science
35(1):28–44
Hinst P (1982) Pragmatische Regeln des logischen Argumentierens. In:
Gethmann CF (ed) Logik und Pragmatik. Zum Rechtfertigungsproblem
logischer Sprachregeln, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, pp 199–215
Justus J (2012) Carnap on concept determination: Methodology for philosophy
of science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2:161–179
Kitcher P (2012) Carnap and the caterpillar. In: Preludes to Pragmatism.
Toward a Reconstruction of Philosophy, OUP, Oxford, New York, pp 192–
209
Lambert JH (1771) Anlage zur Architectonic oder Theorie des Einfachen und
des Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntniß. Johann
Friedrich Hartknoch, Riga, 2 volumes
Lutz S (2012) Criteria of Empirical Significance. Foundations, Relations,
Applications, Quaestiones Infinitae. Publications of the Zeno Institute of
Philosophy, vol LXX. University Utrecht, Utrecht
Paasch S (2016) Mehr vom Sinn als nichts: Eine Abhandlung über das
Sinnvollsein von Ausdrücken. Dissertation
The Constituents of an Explication 29
Pinder M (2016) The explication defence of arguments from reference.
Erkenntnis Online First, DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9868-9
Quine WVO (1960) Word and Object. The Technology Press (MIT), John
Wiley & Sons, New York, London
Reichenbach H (1951) The verifiability theory of meaning. Proceedings of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80(1):46–60
Reinmuth F (2013) Definitionslehre. Lecture notes for the seminar "Logische
Propädeutik und Methodische Begriffsbildung B: Definitionslehre",
Available online
Reinmuth F, Cordes M (2017) Commentary and illocutionary expressions in
linear calculi of natural deduction. Logic and Logical Philosophy 26(2):163–
196, DOI: 10.12775/LLP.2017.002
Schupbach JN (2015) Experimental explication. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 94(3):672–710, DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12207
Shepherd J, Justus J (2015) X-Phi and Carnapian explication. Erkenntnis
80(2):381–402
Siegwart G (1997a) Explikation. Ein methodologischer Versuch. In: Löﬄer W,
Runggaldier E (eds) Dialog und System. Otto Muck zum 65. Geburtstag,
Academia, Sankt Augustin, pp 15–45
Siegwart G (1997b) Vorfragen zur Wahrheit. Ein Traktat über kognitive
Sprachen. Oldenbourg, München
Siegwart G (2007a) Alethic acts and alethiological reflection. an outline of a
constructive philosophy of truth. In: Greimann D, Siegwart G (eds) Truth
and Speech Acts. Studies in the Philosophy of Language, Routledge, New
York, pp 41–58
Siegwart G (2007b) Johann Heinrich Lambert und die präexplikativen
Methoden. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 114:95–116
Sokal A, Bricmont J (1998) Fashionable Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals’
Abuse of Science. Picador, New York
Strawson PF (1963) Carnap’s views on constructed systems versus natural
languages in analytic philosophy. In: Schilpp PA (ed) The Philosophy of
Rudolf Carnap, Open Court, La Salle, Ill., pp 503–518
Tillman FA (1965) Explication and ordinary language analysis. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 25(3):375–383
Wagner P (ed) (2012) Carnap’s Ideal of Explication and Naturalism. Palgrave
Macmillan, Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire
Wilson M (2012) The perils of Pollyanna. In: Wagner P (ed) Carnap’s Ideal of
Explication and Naturalism, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmill, Basingstoke,
Hampshire, pp 205–224
